Mild explosivity in recent crude oil prices by Figuerola-Ferretti, Isabel et al.
Accepted Manuscript
Mild explosivity in recent crude oil prices





To appear in: Energy Economics
Received date: 26 May 2017
Revised date: 31 March 2019
Accepted date: 6 May 2019
Please cite this article as: I. Figuerola-Ferretti, J.R. McCrorie and I. Paraskevopoulos,
Mild explosivity in recent crude oil prices, Energy Economics, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.eneco.2019.05.002
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As
a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The
manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before
it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may























, J. Roderick McCrorie 
b, *






Financial Management Department, Universidad Pontificia Comillas – ICADE, 
Calle Alberto Aguilera 23, 28015 Madrid, Spain & Research Centre for Energy 
Management, ESCP Europe Business School 
 
b 
School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews, St Salvator’s College, 
St Andrews, KY16 9AR, Scotland, U.K. 
 
c 




 May 2017 
This version: 10
th
 May 2019 
 
This paper provides an analysis of oil prices during and in the aftermath of the Global 
Financial Crisis, concentrating on the 2007-08 price spike and the 2014-16 price decline. The 
mildly explosive/multiple bubbles testing strategy by Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015, 
International Economic Review 56(4), 1043-1133) is used to test for price departures from an 
underlying stochastic trend and to assess whether any such departures can be explained by 
fundamentals or other proxy variables. The test dates two significant time periods in both 
Brent and WTI nominal and real front-month futures prices: a mildly explosive episode 
during the 2007-08 spike, prior to the peak of the Global Financial Crisis; and a significantly 
shorter, negative such episode during the 2014-16 price decline, whose commencement is 
dated around a key OPEC meeting in November 2014. Evidence using other commodity 
prices points to explanatory factors beyond commodity markets. A global economic activity 
proxy is found to be decisive in the episode in mid-2008; excess speculation is not. U.S. shale 
oil production, though contributing to the post-June 2014 price decline, is not seen to have 
been decisive. Against some recent work tying the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) to oil futures 
prices, we find no evidence that the VIX decisively affected oil price levels during the sample 
period. The results are compared and contrasted with those obtained by Baumeister and Kilian 
(2016, Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 3, 131-158) via 
a forecasting approach based on a structural vector autoregressive model without financial 
variables. Taken altogether, the results herein provide new evidence based on formal 
statistical testing that help resolve a number of recent controversies in the oil price literature. 
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Crude oil prices over the last decade have exhibited behavior over two notable periods to 
suggest a standard model of martingale behavior over the whole sample may not 
appropriately represent their salient features.  Towards the end of a sustained rise in crude 
oil prices from 2003, prices rose from around $50 per barrel at the beginning of 2007 to 
nearly $150 around the high point of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in mid-2008, 
before collapsing to around $40 towards the year-end. Then, after rising in the aftermath 
of the GFC, with prices enjoying a period of three or so years of stability at just over 
$100, there was a steep decline in prices of around 70% from June 2014 to January 2016, 
prior to a recovery. During this price decline, commodity prices fell by nearly 50% from 
peaks obtained in the aftermath of the GFC. 
     While there is now a considerable amount of literature on the oil price spike 
during the 2007-08 period (e.g. Hamilton, 2009, and the discussion therein), the 
ramifications of the GFC have continued to sustain controversies relating to 
identifying its principal cause. A key question is whether a demand fundamental or 
excess speculation was decisive in the run-up in prices towards their high point in 
mid-2008 (e.g. Kilian and Murphy, 2014; Singleton, 2014; Pavlidis et al. 2018). In 
the same vein, there is currently no consensus as to whether the mid-2014 to early 
2016 price decline had a principal driver among multiple causes. Azeki and 
Blanchard (2014) have conjectured the price decline resulted from consequences – 
actual and expected – of supply increases from the U.S. shale oil revolution.  In work 
more directly sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Husein et al. 
(2015) also pointed to the relevance of supply over demand factors, and suggested 
that the evidence for excess speculation or financialization was comparatively 
weaker. In a World Bank Group policy note, Baffes et al. (2015) pointed to 
weakening global demand, a shift in the policy of the Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and an appreciating U.S. dollar. Baumeister and Kilian 
(2016) saw the price fall as largely having been based on a negative shift in demand 
expectations; while a recent World Bank Flagship Report (2018) focussed on the 
geopolitical risks; the inability of OPEC to regulate global oil supply; and 
deteriorating global growth prospects. The works just cited reflect a myriad of 



















around and in the aftermath of the GFC.  The current lack of agreement points 
towards the need to assess the decisiveness of potential drivers using formal 
statistical tests. With the echo of the GFC continuing even a decade on, the 
importance of assessing the role of oil price drivers remains, given the wider bearing 
oil prices have on the world economy. 
     The main purpose of this paper is to analyze recent oil prices around and in the 
aftermath of the GFC, and to assess the role of potential drivers using an approach 
based on formal statistical testing. We use the mildly explosive test strategy 
proposed by Phillips, Shi and Yu (2015a; 2105b, PSY),
1
 which by design is 
formulated to address questions based on data sets that embody the non-stationarity 
seen around or in the aftermath of the GFC. Some authors have used the strategy 
narrowly as a way of “date-stamping bubbles” but here, as effected in the pioneer 
paper by Phillips, Wu and Yu (2011, PWY), we provide a direct approach towards 
testing the role of fundamental or proxy variables in a context where other, 
potentially rival methods have been justified only under less realistic assumptions. 
Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015) and Figuerola-Ferretti and McCrorie (2016) have 
shown how the PSY strategy can be tailored to the analysis of the prices of 
commodities such as oil. Here, we offer a number of results to address recent 
controversies in the oil price literature. We offer new, clarifying evidence on the 
extent to which demand and excess speculation were decisive during the 2007-08 
price spike, and on the extent to which oil prices and other commodity prices moved 
cojointly as the GFC unfolded. We assess the potential role of demand and supply 
shocks in the 2014-16 price fall; and we offer evidence on the decisiveness of the 
dollar numeraire, above-ground inventories and U.S. shale oil production over the 
sample period. We also provide a direct statistical test for excess speculation in oil, 
and assess whether a key financial variable, the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Volatility Index (CBOE VIX), played a decisive role in oil prices over the sample 
period, as has been suggested in some recent work. 
     In a recent analysis of crude oil prices, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (2016, EIA) discussed seven main, broadly agreed drivers of oil 
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 The use of the acronym “PSY” has become standard for the recursive test proposed by Phillips et al. 
(2015). All such acronyms introduced in the main text are also displayed alongside the full article 



















prices. These involved the four elements of supply and demand of crude oil by 
OPEC and non-OPEC countries; the relationship between spot and futures prices; 
market balance (which depends on inventories); and the nature of trading on 
financial markets. There was not an attempt, however, to assess how decisive each 
element had been in determining the recent oil price decline. Baumeister and Kilian 
(2016) made such an assessment using a forecasting approach based on a structural 
vector autoregressive (SVAR) model, and showed that more than half the price 
decline was in principle predictable in real time as of June 2014. Taken at face value, 
their findings suggest that part of the price decline can be attributed to adverse 
demand shocks reflecting a slowing global economy in the first half of 2014, and 
showed the remaining fall could be associated with positive oil supply shocks that 
occurred prior to July 2014. The strength of their approach, which embodies 
important methodological advances by Kilian (2009) and the structural model of 
Kilian and Murphy (2014), lies in its ability to take account of oil price supply and 
demand shocks through the role it gives to expectations in the formation of oil prices. 
This means that, realistically, changes in expectations can affect oil prices even when 
fundamentals are not adjusting. Nevertheless, their approach also has disadvantages. 
Firstly, the lag structure is fixed ex ante as an SVAR model of order 24, chosen 
simply to reflect two years’ worth of monthly data, even although statistical 
inference in VAR models changes in general if a different lag structure is used.
2
 
Secondly, while there were attempts to ensure their VAR is stationary through the 
design of the structural model, this is not tested. Indeed, we show here it is the very 
aspect of non-stationarity in crude oil prices that is salient during two time periods of 
interest. Thirdly, their structural model is based on strong informational assumptions 
in which agents directly observe structural shocks, to support an inventory-led 
strategy to detect speculative effects that is based on the classical theory of storage. 
Sockin and Xiong (2015) model the informational frictions that agents may face in 
the global oil market which, if true, challenge the classical theory of storage and 
render the structural model misspecified.  Fourthly, the structural model does not 
include some financial variables that potentially reflect changes in the oil market that 
occurred around and in the aftermath of the GFC. For example, Cheng et al. (2015) 
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empirically document recent “convective risk flows” between commodity futures 
prices and the positions of various trader groups to changes in the VIX. 
     The above comments on the Baumeister and Kilian (2016) approach do not 
detract from the essential aspect of their contribution – the provision they make for 
shocks – but they do motivate considering an alternative, reduced-form approach to 
reassess or to consolidate their findings.  Reduced-form models can provide useful, 
complementary evidence when there are questions over the specification and 
properties of a given structural model, or indeed of other, potential structural 
models.
3
 This type of evidence will be useful, for example, when assessing the 
potential role played by OPEC in late-November 2014 when, in response to a supply 
glut arising from increased U.S. shale oil production, it upheld its production ceiling 
rather than agreeing cuts as was its usual policy. 
     Until recently, directly testing for trend departures in an explosive direction, of 
the sort that would be appropriate for the features in the crude oil data described 
above, represented a considerable challenge because conventional tests based on a 
model embodying a stochastic trend are very sensitive to explosive departures from 
the null. The strategy recently proposed by PSY (2015a,b) offers a natural way 
forward, given its efficacy in testing for departures from an unobservable stochastic 
trend such as random walk behavior, and departures from fundamental value, in the 
direction of a positive or negative mildly explosive process alternative (to be defined 
below). The property of mild explosivity is key because it stochastically dominates 
random walk behavior, and any detected departure from trend in this direction would 
represent a salient feature in the time series to be explained. PSY (2015b) show their 
test has desirable asymptotic properties; in particular, it offers a (statistically) 
consistent basis upon which to date the origination and collapse of such episodes and 
a statistically justified approach of testing whether individual factors played a 
decisive role in any departure from an underlying stochastic trend. Other, potentially 
rival approaches, such as those based on Markov regime switching models, do 
compute estimates under plausible assumptions but statistical inference and 
hypothesis testing pertaining to the estimated parameters are not currently justified to 
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the same degree under the type of non-stationarity that is characteristic of the data 
during and in the aftermath of the GFC. 
     Our methodological contribution is distinguished through its examination of the 
robustness of the detected date-stamped episodes to a changing dollar numeraire; its 
unified treatment of both the 2007-08 spike and 2014-16 price decline; and, most 
cogently, in its full use of the PWY/PSY testing apparatus to assess the decisiveness 
of potential drivers of recent oil prices.
4
 We provide new, decisive evidence on the 
role of a global economic activity fundamental in explaining the rise in oil prices 
during the 2007-08 spike but provide contrasting evidence on a role for excess 
speculation. For what seems to be the first time on the basis of a formal statistical 
test, we associate the high point of nominal prices in 2008 to an oil-specific event: an 
announcement by U.S. President George W. Bush that ended an executive ban on 
offshore drilling.
5
 The short, negative episode detected in late 2014 is dated for the 
benchmark prices just after the OPEC meeting in November 2014, and here the 
economic activity fundamental is not seen to be decisive in explaining this departure 
in trend. Our approach therefore allows us to draw a contrast between the price rise 
in 2007-08 and fall in 2014-16. No empirical evidence that the VIX or excess 
speculation decisively affected oil price levels is found during the sample period, 
counter to some recent work that has proposed transmission mechanisms from the 
VIX to oil futures prices. The clarifying role of this evidence against the extant 
literature is described in detail below. 
      The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives some background on the main 
crude oil price benchmarks and briefly presents their chronology over the last decade. 
Section 3 summarizes the PSY mildly explosive/bubbles testing methodology. In 
Section 4, the test is applied to nominal front-month futures prices for the two main 
crude oil benchmark series, and then to the same two series deflated by the U.S. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) and by the currency value of the Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR) basket to control for a potentially changing dollar numeraire. In Section 5, we 
provide some interpretation of our results, focussing on the potential drivers of recent 
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 Our preliminary-stage findings on date-stamping mildly explosive structural breaks connects to and, 
as we describe later, mildly overlaps with some extant work in the mild explosivity/bubbles literature. 
None of this work, however, embeds the analysis of fundamentals and speculation into the testing 
procedure, as is done here. 
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crude oil prices. Here, nominal prices are deflated by natural proxies for two 
traditional fundamental variables, global economic activity and above-ground 
inventory supply, and then by a financial variable, the VIX, as a means of assessing 
the extent of the wider role that oil futures now play in portfolio management and in 
calculations of systemic market risk. We also provide a direct test for excess 
speculation based on Working’s T-index. Section 6 provides a point-by-point 
summary of our results and their role in resolving certain recent controversies in the 
oil price literature. 
 
2. Crude oil prices over the last decade 
There are two principal crude oil benchmarks based on quality and location – Brent 
Blend and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) – that are used by buyers of crude oil and 
speculators (who never actually take delivery of it). Around two-thirds of all crude 
contacts reference Brent Blend,
6
 making it the most important marker price by 
volume. WTI refers to oil extracted from wells in the U.S. that is piped to Cushing, 
Oklahoma and is the main benchmark for oil consumed in the U.S. WTI crude is 
lighter and sweeter (i.e. has a lower sulphur content) than Brent Blend which, ceteris 
paribus, would make it the more expensive crude oil but supplies of the former are 
landlocked and are relatively expensive to ship to other parts of the World. Some 
important recent instances of spreads attributed to factors other than quality and 
location have been reported (e.g. Büyükşahin et al., 2013) and are briefly discussed 
below. We focus on front-month crude oil futures data, which represent the settlement 
prices of the contracts that are closest to delivery with the highest open interest, and 
against which bid/offer prices and deals for physical cargos of crude oil are 
referenced.  Importantly, they are the two benchmark oil contracts, and they are traded 
on different markets: Brent futures on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE, into which 
the International Petroleum Exchange has been incorporated) and WTI contracts 
principally on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). There is a multitude of 
oil prices including spot prices and futures prices at different maturities, and any true 
assessment of “oil price explosivity” would confront the aspect of price discovery 
through extracting information from multiple time series. Different approaches to 
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price discovery exist: for example, Gibson and Schwartz (1990) and Schwartz (1997) 
posit different specifications for spot prices and a convenience yield fundamental, 
implying a specific path for the forward price. See also Cortazar et al. (2015). 
Figuerola-Ferretti and Gonzalo (2010) offer an alternative view in which spot and 
futures prices are co-integrated.  Recent work that discusses the relationship between 
oil spot and futures prices includes Wang and Wu (2013); Zhang and Wang (2013); 
Chen et al. (2014); Shrestha (2014); Balcilar et al. (2015); Chang and Lee (2015); and 
Nicolau and Palomba (2015). Pavlidis et al. (2017) proffer an approach through which 
differences between spot and forward (futures) prices are exploitable in a test for 
periodically collapsing bubbles, which Pavlidis et al. (2018) apply to oil prices. This 
approach obviates the need for fundamentals under assumptions that speculative 
bubbles in oil exist and the connection posited between spot and futures prices is true. 
Their conclusions are tied to an exogenously chosen measure of market expectations. 
     Here we show, insofar as our focus is on the detection and date-stamping of mildly 
explosive periods, that the use of spot prices or front-month futures prices is 
inconsequential in practice and that this conclusion is robust to a potentially changing 
dollar numeraire.  Many oil futures traders follow strategies in which they never make 
or take delivery of physical oil: some unwind their positions and extract monetary 
gain or loss by selling the futures contract previously bought; others, in a strategy 
called rolling, repeatedly roll over their position by selling a current futures contract 
before expiry, and thereafter purchase the next month’s contract. The futures market 
therefore supports both hedging, where net gains and losses are used to offset 
fluctuations in operating earnings; and speculation, where actual net gains are counted 
as profit or loss.
7
 Our desire to test the roles of excess speculation and the VIX 
motivates our focus on oil futures prices above and beyond their being the market 
reference prices. We shall compare and contrast our results with those obtained by 
others using spot prices, and those obtained by Tsvetanov et al. (2016) on the shape of 
the oil futures curve. 
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 The spot price of oil contains forward-looking elements based on expectations that cannot be captured 
by past data. It is natural that market participants trade on this information: in the oil market, this is 
done predominantly through the purchase and sale of futures contracts rather than through the 
purchase, storage and sale of physical oil. Under perfect arbitrage, the two activities are equivalent, 
with spot and futures prices being jointly determined, and responding to, the same fundamentals. In the 
sequel, we briefly compare our results with those obtained by Fantazzini (2016) using spot prices, 



















     Hamilton (2008) and Alquist et al. (2013) discuss whether to employ nominal or 
real prices in an analysis of oil prices. Having sympathy with an argument in the 
former paper – that the CPI deflator can affect the ratio as much as the nominal price 
when influenced by effects seemingly unrelated to oil – we focus primarily on 
nominal prices. Where relevant, however, we shall also report results for real prices. 
When considering proxy variables or indices, we first assess their properties against 
the nominal price series, and then either against the real series or by examining ratios 
of the nominal prices to each variable and index. Using ratios obviates the need to 
deflate variables in order to discuss real effects, although some care needs to be 
applied given the potential for the use of a ratio to distort underlying statistical 
inference. With the overall approach, we are able naturally to follow the strategy 
proposed by PWY (2011) and Phillips and Yu (2011) in their treatment of 
fundamentals based on formal statistical testing. And at the same time, we can make 
direct comparisons with the results obtained by Baumeister and Kilian (2016) 
pertaining to real oil spot prices. 
      Our sample begins in January 2003, at the point from which the CBOE’s revised, 
model-free measure of the VIX has been calculated. This turns out to be just prior to 
the beginning of the sustained rise seen in oil prices during the last decade. The PSY 
test relies on a choice of an initial fraction of the data and the various test statistics and 
critical values are functions of that choice. Our chosen sample end-date is the end of 
April 2016. This end-date is explicitly chosen to be the same as used by Fantazzini 
(2016) to ensure there can be a direct comparison of our results, based on front-month 
futures, with his results based on spot prices. This end-date is just far enough into 
2016 to remove potential end-of-sample dating issues, following the recovery in oil 
prices in early 2016. Given our focus on mild explosivity in the aftermath of the GFC, 
there is little to be gained in considering an extended sample period; for while oil 
prices have risen and fallen since then, they have not done so abruptly enough to 
suggest a departure from random walk or martingale behaviour as is of interest here.  
     We use weekly data to facilitate testing for potentially relevant, shorter periods of 
mild explosivity than monthly data would permit. This sampling frequency is 
appropriate for assessing aspects of oil financialization while at the same time is low 



















fundamentals. Our primary data sources are the Bloomberg International and EIA 
databases.  Full details of the data are provided in the supplementary Data-In-Brief file 
referenced at the end of the paper. 
     By way of providing a brief market chronology of the benchmark prices over the 
sample period, we note that both Brent and WTI prices began a steady year-on-year 
rise from below $30 per barrel at the beginning of the sample, to over $50 in 2005, 
over $60 in 2005. They reached around $75 in mid-2006 before dropping back to $60 
in early-2007. Prices were over $90 by October 2007, around $100 by late-November 
2007 and rose sharply to a peak seen in the ICE Brent price of just under $147 in mid-
July 2008. 
[Figures 1 and 2 around here] 
The beginning of the 2008 price collapse coincided with a low point in the U.S. 
dollar. The price collapsed below $100 in the late summer of 2008, below $70 in mid-
October, below $60 in November and below $40 in December, during the time the 
GFC was unfolding. Two salient features are therefore the 2003-08 run-up in prices, 
during a period of renewed growth in the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries and rapid industrial growth in Asia, particularly 
in China; and the 2007-08 price spike, where prices in the run-up phase rose 
significantly faster than before. A similar pattern was found in some other commodity 
prices in 2007-08. In 2009, prices began to recover, finally exceeding $100 in 2011 
and then remaining around this level for two or more years. Figure 1 indicates a 
divergence between Brent and WTI nominal prices during this time, which can be 
attributed to U.S. supply bottlenecks at Cushing, Oklahoma (Büyükşahin et al., 2013; 
Zhang and Zhang, 2015; Robe and Wallen, 2016). The other salient feature in oil 
prices during the sample period is the mid-June 2014 to early-2016 price decline, 
which occurred around a time that U.S. shale oil production had increased and China 
and Europe’s demand for oil had decreased. A significant plunge in prices to a four-
year low of just over $70 was seen in late-November 2014, around the time of an 
OPEC meeting which, as noted, did not reinforce the cartel’s then established policy 
of defending prices. Crude oil prices continued to fall in 2015, reaching a price of just 
over $40 in mid-August not seen since February 2009. In December 2015, the price at 



















reached a low of around $26 in early-February. Prices had recovered to around $45 by 
the end of the chosen sample period.  Oil prices began rising in a relatively sustained 
manner in 2017 prior to exhibiting a sharper fall towards the end of 2018; however, a 
standard application of the PSY test indicates that oil prices did not recently exhibit 
mild explosivity. While the recent price behavior is important in some dimensions, it 
is not essential to the main argument here. 
 
3. The PSY mildly explosive/bubble-testing strategy 
     The PSY (2015a,b) strategy represents a breakthrough in the search for a 
statistically rigorous procedure to test for temporary regime shifts of exuberance and 
collapse that are embedded in a time series evolving as a stochastic trend, and 
provides a method of testing whether such shifts are attributable to fundamentals or 
other proxy variables. The test is underpinned by a rigorous statistical theory that is 
appropriate for data that pertains to the GFC and its aftermath, when methods justified 
only under stationarity or unit-root non-stationarity may be insufficient. In this regard, 
the PSY strategy has efficacy not shared by potentially rival methods such those based 
on Markov regime switching models. Even just as an algorithm of structural break 
detection of the type of exuberance and collapse of interest here, Homm and Breitung 
(2012) showed the prototypical PWY (2011) approach performed well in comparison 
with other candidates. PSY (2015b) articulated improvements on the PWY (2011) 
prototype, including robustness to potentially multiple structural breaks. Recently, 
Phillips and Shi (2019) have discussed its efficacy as a real-time monitoring device 
for bubbles and financial crises. 
     The procedure is based upon the notion of a mildly explosive process that was 
introduced by Phillips and Magdalinos (2007): it facilitates constructing appropriate 
statistical theory in autoregressive (AR) models whose AR parameter is locally above 
unity. The property of mild explosivity stochastically dominates random walk and 
martingale behavior in a way that makes its incidence a key feature of a time series to 
be explained. 
     The PWY/PSY testing strategy comprises three steps: 
 testing the null hypothesis that there are no mildly explosive periods in the 



















 if the test rejects, date-stamping the mildly explosive period(s) in the sample; 
 assessing whether detected mildly explosive episodes may be due to the 
behavior of fundamentals or other variables. 
As discussed above, most authors have tended to concentrate on using the first two 
steps as a way of “date-stamping bubbles” but here the reduced-form strategy is fully 
utilized to generate stylized facts against which the properties of (actual or potential) 
structural models can be assessed. This evidence can be used to bring clarity to 
various recent controversies surrounding the behavior of oil prices around and in the 
aftermath of the GFC.  Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015) and Figuerola-Ferretti and 
McCrorie (2016) show how the PWY/PSY strategy can be tailored to commodities 
such as oil, which do not have a natural, observable fundamental playing the role that 
dividends play to stocks, and where markets can be in backwardation or contango 
(e.g. Morana, 2013; Sharma and Escobari, 2018). 
 
      Under the null hypothesis of the test, the time series of interest can in general 
follow a unit root process with an asymptotically negligible drift: 
2
1
1 ,  
  ttt xTdx ,      (1) 
where )1(0 pOx  , d is a parameter and   is a localizing coefficient that controls the 
magnitude of the drift as T . Starting from a fraction 1r  and ending at a fraction 










,     (2) 
where k is the lag order chosen on sub-samples using the Schwarz Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC), and t  ~ i.i.d. (0,
2
, 21 rr
 ).  The number of observations in 
the regression is  ww rTT  , where  .  is the floor function, and we denote the usual 





     PSY (2015a&b) introduce two statistics, the backward sup ADF (BSADF) statistic 










rrrrr ADFrBSADF  .      (3) 



















where the endpoint of the sample is fixed at 2r  and the window size is allowed to 
expand from an initial fraction 0r  of the total sample to 2r . PSY (2015a) propose 0r  
be chosen according to the standard rule Tr 8.101.00  , where T is the sample 
size. This procedure defines a particular BSADF statistic. The GSADF statistic is then 
constructed through repeated implementation of the BSADF procedure for each 
]1,[ 02 rr  . Critical values are obtained by simulation. PSY (2015a&b) provide 
limiting distribution theory and small sample simulation evidence.  See also Pavlidis 
et al. (2017). 
     The null test of no mildly explosive periods is based on the GSADF statistic. Date-
stamping mildly explosive periods is achieved through the BSADF statistic: the 
origination and termination points of a first mildly explosive period, er ,1  and fr ,1 , are 
estimated, subject to a minimum duration condition, by 











 is the 100(1 – T )% right-sided critical value of the BSADF statistic 
based on  2rT  observations and δ is a tuning parameter that can be chosen on basis 
of sampling frequency. A tuning parameter of unity, reflecting a standard application 
of the test, implies a minimum duration condition of log(T) observations. A mildly 
explosive period is declared if the BSADF statistic is above its critical value for at 
least    )log(ˆ ,1 TrT e   observations. Conditional on a first mildly explosive period 
having been found and estimated to have terminated at fr ,1̂ , the procedure is then 
repeated in search of a second and possibly subsequent periods.  PSY (2015b) show 
that, subject to rate conditions, the sequential procedure provides consistent estimates 
of the origination and termination dates of one, two and, in principle, more mildly 
explosive episodes. 
     The data generation process (DGP) under the alternative hypothesis embodies 
structural breaks in the form of K mildly explosive episodes in the sample period, 



















within periods of prevailing martingale-type behavior in the intervals ],1[ ,10 eN  , 
],[ ,,1 ejfjjN    (j = 1, 2 , . . . , K – 1) and ],[ , TN fKK  , as follows:  
)(1)()(1)( 101 ittTttt BtxNtxx        
    )(1










      (t = 1, . . . , T)     (6) 
 TcT /1  ,   c > 0,  )1,0( .                   (7) 
     Under the given conditions on c and ,  the AR parameter T  is greater than unity.  
Phillips and Magdalinos (2007) called this condition a mildly integrated root on the 
explosive side of unity, with the underlying process being a mildly explosive process. 
Because the statistics remain the same if the time series is reversed, such processes 
can be rising or falling, and for our purpose can therefore be applied to test for a 
departure in trend in both the 2007-08 oil price spike and the mid-2014 to early-2016 
price decline.  We refer to testing the recent price decline for a departure in trend as 
being in the (negative) mildly explosive direction rather than being in a mildly 
implosive direction because “implosion” has typically been used in the literature to 
refer to a collapse period immediately following a bubble (Phillips and Shi, 2018).  
Implosion in the PSY test is modelled, for each i, by   ixxx eifi ,,  , where 
)1(pi Ox 
 . For a positive mildly explosive episode, this entails a collapse to the 
value of the last pre-bubble observation plus an )1(pO  perturbation, from which the 
process resumes its trend. Where the implosion of a mildly explosive process may be 
relevant, e.g. in the collapse phase of the 2007-08 oil price spike, we supplement our 
application of the PSY test with information obtained from its application to the 
reverse regression, as proposed by Phillips and Shi (2018).  
     The PSY test has sometimes been presented as a test for economic or financial 
bubbles although for two reasons we have avoided this nomenclature here. Firstly, the 
notion of a “bubble” has a number of different connotations in the literature which, 
given our focus on the purely statistical property of mild explosivity, we need not 
address or tie down here.  In this sense, our approach differs from, say, the approach 
by Pavlidis et al. (2018) which is predicated on assumptions about the existence and 
nature of speculative bubbles. Secondly, results from applying the PWY/PSY testing 



















of the strategy is implemented. For example, Tsvetanov et al. (2016) and Fantazzini 
(2016) declare bubble episodes in oil prices mainly on the basis of the second-stage 
implementation of the test.  Gronwald (2016) and Su et al. (2017) relate their results 
to the wider, economic environment but without using the third stage of the test 
procedure. The fundamentals and proxy variables they correlate with oil are therefore 
not subjected to a statistical test to assess their relevance or decisiveness. The third-
stage offers information on the salience of any departure from an underlying trend in 
a mildly explosive direction. PWY (2011) show a mildly explosive departure in the 
NASDAQ price index was of an order of non-stationarity greater than exhibited by 
the dividend fundamental, thereby providing evidence for speculative behavior. In 
contrast, Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015) tied detected mildly explosive prices in non-
ferrous metals to the behavior of a stock-to-use ratio fundamental, allowing them to 
conclude that non-ferrous metals, often characterized by fluctuating demand around 
inelastic supply, showed mildly explosive behavior that did not constitute a bubble, 
defined in terms of a departure from fundamental value. In both cases, the results of 
the third stage materially affect the interpretation of any detected departure from 
trend. For this reason, an important aim of this paper is to investigate whether any 
detected mildly explosive episodes in oil prices can be linked to fundamentals or 
financial variables. Following the general strategy outlined in PWY (2011) and 
Phillips and Yu (2011), we apply the PSY test to assess whether the degree of non-
stationarity in the price series is greater than the degree of non-stationarity in the 
particular fundamental or proxy variable. 
     The approach taken here can be contrasted with those based on alternative 
modeling approaches towards rational or speculative bubbles in oil prices. Markov 
regime switching models offer an approach where a posited bubble component can be 
in one of a number of states (or regimes) with certain probabilities.  Notable papers 
are Shi and Arora (2012), Lammerding et al. (2013), Brooks et al. (2015) and Zhang 
and Wang (2015).  Balcombe and Fraser (2017) explicitly ask whether bubbles have 
an explosive signature in Markov switching models.  Such models offer a potentially 
rival modeling approach to the one here but the methods and procedures used 
currently lack formal statistical justification in the context of the non-stationarity seen 



















At its heart, the problem in the context of explosive time series is the lack of a 
statistical invariance principle to support a distribution theory for test statistics. To our 
knowledge, this problem has not been formally addressed in the Markov switching 
literature. The achievement of PWY(2011) and successors, on the back of theoretical 
work by Phillips and Magdalinos (2007), was to provide a basis for conducting valid 
statistical inference with data having properties of a type apparently thrown up by the 
GFC. For this reason, it is natural to use the PSY test in an analysis of possible 
explosivity in recent oil price series that contain both the 2007-08 spike and 2014-16 
decline. 
     Finally, we mention that there are other aspects to oil prices that could be better 
analyzed using other approaches.  For example, Bencivenga et al. (2012) discussed 
the GFC from the point of view of oil price volatility set within a macroeconomic 
framework.  D’Ecclesia et al. (2014) considered a model where oil price dynamics are 
explicitly driven by both macroeconomic and financial shocks. Using a time-varying 
VAR model, Jebabli et al. (2014) point oil prices in a different direction, in an 
examination of the transmission mechanism between food, energy and financial 
markets.  Lin et al. (2014) focussed on the issue of dynamic volatility and volatility 
transmission between oil prices and the stock market. This also necessitated a 
multivariate approach, where the authors used a Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
(DCC-) GARCH model. 
 
4. Test results 
In this section, we conduct the first two stages of the PSY test using both Brent and 
WTI benchmark series, and the corresponding spot prices, documenting any detected 
departures from an underlying stochastic trend in the direction of a mildly explosive 
alternative. We also examine the robustness of the results to a changing dollar 
numeraire and to possible non-stationary volatility in the shocks driving the oil prices.  
In Section 5, we use the third stage of the PSY procedure to provide an interpretation 
of the salient features we find in the data using specifically chosen proxy variables for 
traditional fundamentals, a financial variable and a measure for excess speculation. 
Taken as a whole, this provides an evidence base against which some of the recent 



















     Formally, the GSADF statistic tests in the direction of at least one episode of 
mildly explosive behavior in the sample. Tables 1A and 1B give the GSADF statistics 
corresponding to the Brent and WTI nominal front-month futures prices observed on 
a weekly basis and the same series deflated by the currency value of the SDR basket, 
and an interpolated U.S. CPI series given that the raw CPI series is available only at a 
monthly frequency.
8
  Critical values are generated for the given sample size and the 
rule-based value of r0. 
[Tables 1A – 1D around here] 
In every case, for both spot and futures price series, the GSADF statistic rejects the 
null hypothesis of there being no mildly explosive periods during 2003-2016 at the 
1% significance level. With such corroboratory evidence for mild explosivity in the 
sample, we move to the second, date-stamping stage of the PSY procedure, which 
uses the BSADF statistic, noting that because of the imposition of a minimum 
duration condition, it is possible that no mildly explosive period is actually dated here. 
Figures 2A and 2B show the respective BSADF sequences for the two benchmark 
series at the 5% significance level.  The sequences for the spot price series are similar. 
[Figures 2A and 2B around here] 
     We date mildly explosive episodes by the periods during which the BSADF 
sequence is above the 5% critical value line such that the minimum duration condition 
is satisfied. These are reported in Tables 2A and 2B for both front-month futures and 
spot prices. We find essentially the same two mildly explosive episodes dated for both 
benchmark Brent and WTI nominal and real (U.S.-CPI-deflated) front-month futures 
and spot prices. These are the central results of this paper: a positive mildly explosive 
episode is dated between mid-May and mid-July 2008 (when nominal prices are 
rising) and a negative such episode is dated between late November/early December 
2014 and mid-February 2015 (when nominal prices are falling). The only discrepancy 
is seen in the Brent real spot price series, where no mildly explosive episode is dated 
at the 10% significance level. Given the weekly sampling frequency, we report dates 
                                                          
8
 The interpolation method to obtain a weekly U.S. CPI series is described in the supporting Data-In-
Brief file. The currency value of the SDR is determined using a basket of major currencies (the U.S. 
dollar, the euro, Japanese yen and pound sterling) based on market exchange rates. Adjusting nominal 
oil price series by the U.S. CPI index and the SDR currency value confers some robustness on our 
approach but is not definitive because the oil price is a world price denominated in dollars: prices can 
rise in one currency and fall in another. Deflating by the U.S. CPI, we follow the convention that has 



















identified up to the Friday of a given week. Strong evidence is provided on the end-
date of the first episode: in most cases, the estimated end-date is the Friday 
immediately following the Bush announcement on 14 July 2008 lifting the ban on 
offshore drilling.  In all but two cases, the start-date of the second episode is date-
stamped to around a week or so of the OPEC meeting on November 27 and lasts for 
about a month.  Ordinarily, results such as these would provide strong evidence for 
spot and front-month futures prices being closely attuned. The two exceptions are, 
however, the Brent real and nominal spot price series, where the start-date is 
estimated to be earlier, in October 2014. This is potentially crucial because, if true, it 
would mean the departure from random walk behavior in Brent spot prices occurred 
prior to the OPEC meeting in late-November. Given that Fantazzini (2016) obtained a 
similar result,
9
 we undertake a further robustness assessment below. 
[Tables 2A and 2B around here] 
The third columns of Tables 2A and 2B show synchroneity between the date-
stamping using SDR-adjusted prices on one hand, and nominal and real prices on the 
other.
10
 This indicates the depreciating dollar in mid-2008 or the appreciating dollar 
                                                          
9
 We briefly compare our date-stamping results with extant work where we see potential overlap, as 
part of our robustness checks.  The results of Tsvetanov et al. (2016) and Gronwald (2016) relate to 
the first episode. Using WTI weekly data but date-stamping only to the nearest month, Tsvetanov et 
al. (2016) detect a mildly explosive period in the front-month contract (ibid., Figure 5, Contract 1) 
between April and July 2008, beginning a week or two earlier than ours.  Gronwald (2016) 
demonstrates a similar period of explosivity as one of three detected within a longer data span, but 
without tying down dates. Su et al. (2017) date-stamped a number of bubbles in spot prices over a 
thirty-year period, and Sharma and Escobari (2018) and Liu et al. (2018) looked at bubble detection in 
the energy sector as a whole, although precise date-stamping was of secondary importance to their 
main arguments. Caspi et al. (2018) report a longer episode in real prices than detected here, from 
October 2007 to August 2008, right at the end of their study of historical oil prices using monthly data 
since the nineteenth century. It should be noted (in a way not to detract from their contribution to the 
historical evidence base) their results were obtained using an earlier version of the PSY test: indeed 
the data themselves indicate that real oil prices had begun their steep decline before the end of their 
last detected episode. The overall consistency of our results across spot and futures prices, and for 
both real and nominal prices, demonstrates robustness in the detection of the first episode 
     Fantazzini (2016) focusses mainly on the second episode. Using daily data, he reports a (negative) 
mildly explosive episode between early October 2014 and late February 2015 in Brent nominal and real 
spot prices, and between early December 2014 and late March 2015 in WTI nominal and real spot 
prices. In robustness checks using weekly data and with a longer data span, an earlier episode from 
mid-May 2008 to mid-July 2008 is reported, synchronous across Brent and WTI real and nominal spot 
prices (ibid., Table 2, p. 392). The later episode is dated in each case from October 2014 to April 2015, 
with exact synchronicity reported between Brent real and nominal prices, and between WTI real and 
nominal prices. 
10
 The 2008 episode for SDR-adjusted WTI prices detected at the 5% significance level is slightly 
longer, beginning in late-April rather than mid-May. This result is not especially significant given that 




















during 2014 were not decisive in the movements in oil prices that led to the rejection 
of random walk null behaviour. Evidence from the BSADF sequence relating to both 
Brent and WTI prices points to the actual appreciation in the dollar numeraire of just 
under 10% after June 2014 as having mildly contributed to the post-June 2014 oil 
price decline. This corroborates the conclusion reached by Baumeister and Kilian 
(2016) on the basis of their structural approach but contradicts the view of Baffes et 
al. (2015) that it was a decisive factor. 
     In Section 5, one of our aims will be to examine whether a fundamental can be tied 
to the run-up in oil prices in 2008.  The collapse phase of the 2007-08 oil price is also 
potentially important. Given the abrupt way the PSY test models price implosion 
under the alternative, we also report, in Tables 2C-2F, results for Brent and WTI 
nominal and real prices based on applying the PSY test using the reverse regression 
method proposed by Phillips and Shi (2018). 
[Tables 2C – 2F around here] 
The similar end-dates for the first episode demonstrate the robustness of the PSY test 
in this case. And while the test based on the reverse regression picks up the high point 
of prices in June 2014 prior to the beginning of the price decline when no minimum 
duration condition is applied, it detects nothing at all using customary significance 
levels under the standard duration condition. 
     Simulation evidence presented by Harvey et al. (2016), applied to the PWY (2011) 
prototype of the PSY test, suggests the efficacy of the test may be affected by a size 
distortion arising from changes in the unconditional variance of the shocks across the 
different regimes. This property, which following early literature they call “non-
stationary volatility”, can be informally assessed by examining the plot of the first 
differenced series. 
[Figures 3A – 3C around here] 
Figures 3A and 3B show that both the Brent and WTI benchmark nominal series do 
seem to exhibit some increase in volatility during and in the immediate aftermath of 
the price spike in 2008. Figure 3C suggests the evidence is stronger in Brent spot 
prices, which is potentially important given the disparity seen between spot and 
futures prices the second episode was date-stamped. While the evidence is weaker 



















metals complex over the same period, we follow Harvey et al. (2016) and apply the 
wild bootstrap resampling scheme to the first differenced data.  This procedure 
controls for the (potential) problem in hand by replicating the pattern of volatility in 
the resampled data that is present in the original innovations.
11
 This makes for an 
unambiguously more stringent test than is provided by a standard application of the 
PSY test. 
 [Figures 4A – 4C around here] 
Figures 4A – 4C overlay the Brent nominal spot prices, the Brent real (CPI-deflated) 
spot prices and WTI front-month nominal prices and their respective BSADF 
sequences with a number of wild-bootstrap-adjusted critical value lines computed 
using 5,000 replications.
12
 In all cases, there are spikes in the BSADF sequences that 
either touch or go above the 5% critical value line for a period, around the time of the 
first episode in mid-2008 detected using standard PSY critical values. Similar spikes 
go above the 1% critical value line from early December 2014, around the time of the 
second previously detected episode. As reported in Table 2C, at the 5% significance 
level with imposed minimum duration condition, there are mildly explosive periods 
dated only for the second episode, that were shorter than were detected using standard 
PSY critical values. The mildly explosive period dated for both Brent nominal and 
real spot prices from 12
th
 December is now the same as it is for the front-month 
futures prices and, crucially, occurs after the late-November OPEC meeting. The 
evidence suggests that the date-stamping of the origination of the second episode 
using the standard PSY test was not robust to non-stationary volatility. 
[Table 2G around here] 
Evidence using a 10% significance level reveals slightly longer episodes for the three 
chosen series, whose origination in early-December is closer to the OPEC meeting on 
November 27
th
.  The first episode in 2008 is detected in Brent and WTI nominal spot 
and futures prices at the 12% significance level, lasting between mid-June and again 
the Friday in mid-July immediately after the Bush announcement.  As noted, the test 
incorporating the wild bootstrap is a more stringent test, and it is significant for what 
                                                          
11
 The wild bootstrap controls for a wide variety of permanent volatility changes, whether single or 
multiple, abrupt or smooth. A step-by-step algorithm for computing wild bootstrapped critical values in 
the current context is provided, for example, by Figuerola-Ferretti and McCrorie (2016, p. 724). 
12
 This is the same number of replications that PSY (2015a) used in the generation of critical values in 



















follows that such an episode is declared, even if it is near the boundary of what would 
normally be regarded as a conventional significance level. 
     To summarize the evidence in this section: there is compelling evidence on the 
basis of a standard application of the PSY test pointing to two significant departures 
from random walk behavior over the last decade in both nominal and real crude oil 
prices. The first is detected between the second and third quarters of 2008, in the run-
up phase of the 2007-08 spike; and the second beginning in late 2014 and lasting for 
around a month or more, during the post-June 2014 to early-January 2016 price 
decline. Insofar as there is overlap with the extant literature, the results broadly 
corroborate earlier findings and we offer a degree of robustness not hitherto provided. 
In particular, our results are robust to a potentially changing dollar numeraire. Using 
the wild bootstrap, we found that the October 2014 episode detected for spot prices by 
Fantazini (2016) was not robust at conventional significance levels and occurs later, 
notably after the late-November OPEC meeting. A key conclusion is that the use of 
the benchmark futures prices or spot prices is inconsequential for testing for mild 
explosivity in oil prices around and in the aftermath of the GFC. 
     Corroboratory evidence exists outside the PSY framework for the first mildly 
explosive or similar type of episode during 2008. For example, Shi and Arora (2012) 
applied a regime-switching model with the oil price decomposed into deterministic 
and bubble components, and found the estimated probability of being in a bubble-
surviving regime rose just prior to a spike in the estimated probability of being a 
bubble collapsing regime in late-2008.  Similar evidence within the regime-switching 
framework was provided by Lammerding et al. (2013), Brooks et al. (2015) and 
Zhang and Wang (2015).  Zhang and Yao (2016) and Fantazzini (2016) employ a log-
periodic power law model to examine the same.  
 
5. Fundamentals and the role of financial variables 
 
We now apply the third stage of the PSY strategy, which uses the test to assess 
whether the detected mildly explosive periods can be related to fundamentals or other 
proxy variables. In so doing, we can formally assess various conjectures and results 
about the drivers of oil prices that have appeared recently. Even today, economic 



















fundamentals for a given asset or commodity and this means we are forced to follow 
the convention of choosing fundamental and other proxy variables on an ad hoc basis. 
Given the reduced-form nature of our approach, we can only provide corroborative 
evidence: we cannot assert causation between two variables because there is always 
the possibility that a third variable is acting on both the oil price and the proxy 
variable. It is also possible that the same evidence can be consistent with two or more 
competing hypotheses. We can, however, use results from the PSY test to seek 
evidence against causation given that the mild explosivity property dominates other 
features in the series, and in this way we can build up an evidence base that allows the 
implications of potentially different structural model specifications to be assessed. 
     In this section, we firstly view oil through a pure commodity lens and ask whether 
recent oil price behavior was mirrored in other commodities or commodity indices. 
Finding evidence pointing to factors specific to oil, we then consider whether the 
detected mildly explosive episodes pertaining to the 2007-08 oil price spike and the 
post-2014 price collapse were consistent with their having been driven by oil 
fundamentals. We use two traditional fundamentals: global economic activity, which 
we proxy by the Baltic Dry Index; and inventories which, following Phillips and Yu 
(2011) and others, can be proxied by U.S. crude oil stocks that the EIA conveniently 
makes available as end-of-week data.  We then assess recent conjectures regarding the 
financialization of oil, where large numbers of financial actors, specifically 
investment banks, hedge funds and index investors, have become involved in oil and 
commodity futures markets. Financialization has undeniably changed the composition 
of oil markets but whether it has been the major driver of oil prices is much more 
controversial.
13
 We consider evidence using the PSY strategy by taking two 
perspectives: first, to consider whether there was any significant, wider role that might 
have been played by oil prices as an element in financial portfolios or in calculations 
of systemic market risk; and second, to consider whether there is evidence of there 
having been excess speculative activity in oil. The former is assessed using the equity 
VIX and the latter using Working’s (1960) T-index computed using U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) position data. 
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5.1. Oil and other commodities 
We first consider whether commodities other than oil exhibited their own statistically 
significant departures from a random walk behavior, synchronous with our detected 
periods in oil.  Formally, we test the same for copper and zinc – which Azeki and 
Blanchard (2014) cited as exemplars – and the Bloomberg Commodity Index (BCI), 
the preferred index used in the EIA (2016) in its summary of oil price drivers.  This 
represents a sharper approach than simply making an informal appeal to a seemingly 
apparent observation of a coincident boom and bust in certain commodity markets in 
2007-08, such as presented by Sockin and Xiong (2015). 
     Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015) applied the PSY test to weekly data on six London 
Metals Exchange (LME) three-month futures prices, reflecting the most liquid futures 
contract traded. 
[Table 1C around here] 
Table 1C reports new results for the GSADF statistic for copper and zinc, where the 
parameters (the sample start and end dates, and the initial sample fraction r0) are now 
aligned to this paper and thereby include the recent period of commodity price falls.  
The null of no mildly explosive period is rejected at the 1% significance level. The 
BSADF sequence dates mildly explosive episodes in copper between March and June 
2006 and in zinc between December 2015 and February 2016, and March and June 
2006, at the 5% level.  Conclusively, they are not during the two detected episodes for 
oil. Results obtained using the Phillips and Shi (2018) reverse regression approach 
(not reported) offered no additional information. The results for copper and zinc echo 
those for all six non-ferrous metals in Table IV in Figuerola-Ferretti et al. (2015) 
obtained on the basis of a different sample.  
     Comparison of our oil results with those obtained by Figuerola-Ferretti and 
McCrorie (2016) in their application of the PSY test to precious metals are less clear.  
Episodes of mild explosivity in gold and platinum front-month futures prices were 
identified in 2008 in the midst of the GFC, although in the two or three months prior 
to the detected episode in oil. Etienne et al. (2015), using the PSY test with daily data, 
detected some mildly explosive episodes in grain futures prices in 2007 and 2008 but 
each lasted only a few days in length. Although there were two such episodes in 



















     We also applied the PSY test to the BCI, an index measure of a basket of 
commodities where the combined weighting of WTI and Brent prices is 15%. 
Interestingly, the GSADF statistic reported in Table 1C now only rejects the null of 
there being no mildly explosive episode at the 10% significance level. As reported in 
Table 3, the second-stage of the test using the BSADF statistic and minimum duration 
condition again dates the very same two mildly explosive episodes as before, but 
using a 10% critical value line. This higher significance level can be explained by 
combining the fact that the BCI dilutes the role of Brent and WTI prices given our 
lack of strong evidence to reject a random walk null in the other commodities around 
the same time as in oil. 
     Our overall conclusion is that factors beyond the recent behavior of commodity 
prices underlie recent oil prices both in the run-up to the high point in prices during 
the GFC and during the recent oil price decline. Our work corroborates the 
conclusions of Azeki and Blanchard (2014) and Baumeister and Kilian (2016) in this 
regard, but points to commodity-specific differences among the commodities 
observed using weekly data during the boom and bust cycle in 2007-08 considered 
recently by Sockin and Xiong (2015). 
 
5.2. Global economic activity 
Rather than interpolate one of the traditional proxies for global economic activity, 
such as an OECD measure of industrial production available as monthly data, we 
follow the general standpoint of Killian (2009, p. 1005) who constructed a bespoke 
index for the analysis of oil prices based on dry cargo single ocean freight rates.  As a 
leading rather than a coincident indicator, it can better anticipate and capture demand 
shifts for industrial commodities in global markets. Here, we use the Baltic Dry Index 
(BDI) to proxy global economic activity, a similar such index that is available on the 
Bloomberg International Database.
14
 The GSADF statistics of both the BDI reported 
in Table 1E and the ratio of WTI nominal prices to the BDI reported in Table 1F both 
reject the null of there being no mildly explosive episode at the 1% significance level. 
[Tables 1E and 1F around here] 
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 The BDI is an economic indicator issued daily by the London-based Baltic Exchange, and provides 
an assessment of the price of moving raw materials by sea. It measures the demand for shipping 
capacity versus the supply of dry bulk carriers and indirectly measures the global supply and demand 



















Table 4 reports the results of the second-stage of the test. Two mildly explosive 
periods are seen in the BTI index itself, between mid-April until the end of May 2007 
and end-August to end-December 2007.
15
 The test based on the WTI/BDI ratio, as 
reported in Table 5, dates a two-month episode in 2005 and a six-week-or-so episode 
during October and November 2008 when the BDI is falling. 
[Tables 4 and 5 around here] 
     Evidence obtained on the basis of the PSY test to support global economic activity 
having been a key driver of the post-June 2014 oil price decline is therefore non-
existent; however, the extent to which it might explain the behavior of oil prices 
during the 2007-08 price spike depends on the extent to which the BDI can be viewed 
as a leading indicator.  The supply of cargo ships is generally tight and inelastic and 
so marginal increases in the demand for shipping capacity can quickly push up the 
BDI. Because dry bulk primarily consists of materials that function as raw material 
inputs to the production of intermediate or final goods, the index is indeed an 
indicator of future growth and production. The lag time involved is plausibly of a 
length similar to the time difference between the episodes detected in the BDI and in 
nominal oil prices, providing support for global economic activity – a traditional oil 
fundamental – as having been an important driver in the run-up in oil prices during the 
2007-08 oil price spike. Our results therefore provide new support for the 
explanations of the run-up in oil prices in 2007-08 advanced by Hamilton (2009), 
Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Hicks (2013) as being sourced in the real economy.
16
  
This question continues to be of relevance more than a decade on: Pavlidis et al. 
(2018) and Kruse and Wegener (2019) offer similar conclusions on the importance of 
a demand component in early 2008 prices using different methods to those used here. 
     The later, negative mildly explosive episode seen in the ratio of WTI nominal 
prices to the BDI (when nominal prices are falling) indicates that in the immediate 
aftermath of the high point of the GFC in mid-September, when the global financial 
services firm Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed for bankruptcy, WTI oil prices fell 
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 This evidence may be consistent with one, longer mildly explosive episode being detected from mid-
April to mid-Dececmber 2007 on the basis of lower frequency data. 
16
 Indeed, on the basis of a forecasting approach, Kilian and Hicks (2013) showed that the run-up in 
real oil prices over the period from mid-2003 to mid-2008 was attributable to repeated demand shocks.  
As is shown here, however, only during the 2007-08 period was the run-up significant enough for the 
null of random walk behavior to be rejected and only immediately prior to this one period did the BDI 



















faster than can be explained by global economic activity alone. Finally, and not 
insignificantly, the BSADF sequence of the BDI level series, as shown in Figure 6, 
indicates that in 2014 the BDI was falling, which is consistent with the evidence 
provided by Bauermeister and Kilian (2016) in the sense that it conveys that lower 
global demand played some role in the post-June 2014 price decline. 
[Figure 6 around here] 
The BSADF sequence is, however, always below the 5% critical value line around 
this time, suggesting it exhibited a lower degree of non-stationarity than crude oil 
prices. This indicates the BDI did not decisively anticipate the later shift to a 
(negative) mildly explosive regime, which is a weaker result than Bauermeister and 
Kilian’s. This evidence taken at face value also indicates that the drivers of the two 
detected mildly explosive episodes over last decade or so were different in character. 
 
5.3. Inventories 
Deaton and Laroque (1992) argue that the classical fundamental in a commodity price 
setting is the stock or inventory variable. Fantazzini (2016) and Caspi et al. (2018) 
follow Phillips and Yu (2011) in applying the PWY/PSY strategy to crude oil nominal 
spot prices deflated by the traditional above-ground inventory supply proxy of U.S. 
WTI stocks. Using the prototype test by PWY (2011), they detected a mildly 
explosive period in the ratio between March and July 2008 using monthly data. Here, 
on the basis of weekly data, we apply the PSY test – which PSY (2015b) showed 
supersedes the PWY (2011) test – to the U.S. stocks themselves and then to the ratio 
of nominal WTI front-month futures prices to the same. The GSADF statistic for 
stocks reported in Table 1E shows the null hypothesis of no mildly explosive period is 
not rejected at the 10% significance level. We do not therefore proceed to the second, 
date-stamping stage of the PSY test. Consistent with this evidence, the GSADF 
statistic of the ratio of WTI nominal prices to U.S. stocks as reported in Table 1F is 
significant at the 1% level and, as can be seen in Figure 7 and is reported in Table 5, a 
mildly explosive period is dated between mid-May and mid-June 2008 and between 
mid-November 2014 and mid-March 2015. 



















These are coincident with the same such periods in WTI nominal prices alone, as 
reported earlier, but begins slightly later than in the detected period by Phillips and Yu 
(2011) based on monthly spot price data. 
     For the ratio of monthly data on WTI nominal spot prices to U.S. stocks, Caspi et 
al. (2018, Table 2) report a longer mildly explosive period at the end of their sample, 
between July 2007 and September 2008, than Phillips and Yu on the basis of the 
PWY test.
17
  For the same ratio using weekly spot price data, Fantazzini (2016, Table 
3) dates a positive episode between October 2007 and September 2008, and a negative 
episode between mid-December 2014 and mid-March 2015, the first encompassing 
the first episode and the second coincident with the second episode detected using 
WTI nominal prices alone. 
     Taking the evidence altogether, our fundamental proxy does not offer prima facie 
evidence that above-ground inventories drove oil prices either during the run-up in 
prices in 2008 or the post-2014 price decline. Our results therefore corroborate the 
conclusion of Kilian and Lee (2014) that above-ground inventories were not decisive 
in explaining the 2007-08 price spike. Their conclusion was reached using two 
inventory measures. On the basis of the underlying Kilian and Murphy (2014) 
structural model, which embodies the theory of storage, the effect of speculation was 
quantified there as raising the real oil price by between $5 and $14 between March 
and July 2008. Taken at face value, their estimates provide a counterfactual that 
would be insufficient to reverse the conclusions of the PSY test. 
 
5.4. U.S. shale oil and the role of OPEC 
The traditional argument that U.S. stocks proxy above-ground inventory supply is 
based on such inventories being in the country in the world economy that has the 
largest consumption of oil. It neglects other important elements of world supply such 
as the role played by OPEC producers, notably Saudi Arabia, in holding stocks below-
ground.  In recent years, this has been affected by the emergence of U.S. hydraulic 
fracturing (or “fracking”), a technique designed to recover gas and oil from shale 
rock.  Kilian (2017) examines the consequences of the recent emergence of U.S. shale 
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oil on Arab crude oil producers and estimates that the price was around $10 lower in 
mid-2014, falling to about $5 lower in mid-2015. Taken at face value, the estimates 
provide a counterfactual under which its marginal impact can be assessed using the 
PSY test by adjusting prices upwards, but this is not enough to prevent the declaration 
of a mildly explosive episode at the 10% significance level around this time. This 
suggests that while U.S. shale oil played a role in the falling oil price from June 2014, 
it was not decisive in contributing to the short rejection of random walk behavior in 
oil prices in late 2014. 
     Azeki and Blanchard (2014) and Baffes et al. (2015) have argued strongly that the 
OPEC meeting in November 2014 represented a watershed moment: with OPEC 
agreeing to maintain its production ceiling at 30 million barrels per day, it signalled a 
change in policy from one of targeting an oil price band to maintaining market 
share.
18
 This would represent a supply shock where, rather than agreeing on 
production cuts to maintain prices, OPEC signalled a fundamental change in 
expectations about future global oil supply and prices (with clear implications for the 
profitability of emergent and continuing U.S. fracking activity).
19
  If the results using 
the wild bootstrap are taken at face value, all of our results, whether spot or futures 
prices, or real or nominal prices, date a short (negative) mildly explosive episode in 
the midst of the post-June 2014 to early-2016 price decline as beginning around the 
immediate aftermath of the OPEC meeting and lasting for up to two months.  While 
our reduced-form approach can never offer prima facie evidence for such a linkage, 
the consistency of our findings across different series offers strong corroboratory 
evidence.  On the basis of an observed negative forecast error in their proxy for global 
real activity, Baumeister and Kilian (2016) inferred there was a negative demand 
shock in December 2014, which they attributed to an unexpected weakening of the 
global economy. As discussed above, we were unable to demonstrate that there were 
similar, coincident price falls in other commodities around this time.
20
 And from 
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 The role of U.S. shale oil is not unimportant here because the decision may have been motivated by 
predatory pricing considerations that took account of actual and future expectations of supply. 
19
 Behar and Ritz (2017) provide a model to explain this behavior. 
20
 The discrepancy found by Baumeister and Kilian between their prediction at June 2014 of a $27 
decline in oil prices and their attribution of only around $10 to a slowdown in economic activity is 
consistent, as the authors note, with the disparity later seen in the larger decline in crude oil prices from 
around then compared with other commodities. The issue here, however, is that if there had been a 



















today’s standpoint, a negative forecast error in global economic activity around 
December 2014 would not automatically be seen as evidence of a significant, negative 
demand shock given the weak transmission mechanism from falling and low oil prices 
to economic activity that was seen in 2015 and 2016.  Using a different structural 
model that explicitly models the “shale oil revolution”, Belu Mănescu and Nuño 
(2015) found the decline in prices was principally a consequence of unanticipated 
supply shocks. Bataa and Park (2017) employ an SVAR model with structural breaks 
to estimate that around a quarter of the decline in prices between June 2014 and 
February 2016 was attributable to global supply shocks.  Here, we are concerned with 
identifying any episode during the price decline in which prices are inconsistent with 
random walk behavior, and we found the period after the OPEC meeting was salient. 
While we have exploited the advantages offered by a reduced-form approach and the 
evidence is strong in this context, the approach does not allow us positively to identify 
whether the price fall at this time arose from a negative supply or a negative demand 
shock, or for another reason. 
 
5.5. Financial aspects and the OVX 
An interesting element of the Kilian and Murphy (2014) structural model is that it 
does not contain a futures price as a variable. This does not rule out speculation; for it 
can be seen as an inventory demand shock in the spot market that follows changes in 
expected fundamentals. Perfect arbitrage would then imply full pass-through from 
speculation in the futures market to the spot market via changing inventories.
21
 There 
are plausible reasons that have been offered recently, however, to suggest that perfect 
arbitrage might not hold in oil or other commodities markets, with the consequence 
                                                                                                                                                                      
walk behavior, its impact should have been observed in the same way across other commodities; 
otherwise it would have to be derived from another source. 
21
 Hamilton (2009) also points out that if the short-run price elasticity of gasoline demand is zero, there 
is scope for speculation to drive up the real price of oil without crude oil inventories being affected. 
This condition is not testable within the PSY mild explosivity framework. We therefore simply report 
that in their structural model, Kilian and Murphy (2014) related the gasoline demand elasticity to the 
short-run elasticity of oil demand and provided a posterior median estimate of the latter of -0.26, and 
showed there was an 84% probability that this value was below -0.09 (ibid., Table II).  In a different 
model, Baumeister and Peersman (2013) reported evidence to suggest the short-run elasticity of oil 
demand was time varying but that the boundary of their 95% posterior credible set was less than zero 
throughout their sample (ibid., Figure 4). Taken at face value, both sets of results suggest that the case 
of a zero price elasticity of demand is an unlikely explanation for any run-up in crude oil prices seen 



















that inventory data may not be sufficient to capture speculative activity within spot 
and futures markets. Lombardi and Van Robays (2011) provide a structural model 
along the lines of the Kilian and Murphy (2014) model but with incomplete pass-
through. Acharya et al. (2013) propose a model of commodities in which the 
interaction of commodity producers averse to price fluctuations and capital-
constrained speculators induces a link between a financial friction in the futures 
market and spot prices. Sockin and Xiong (2015) and Basak and Pavlova (2016) 
similarly provide models of financialization that impact upon both commodity futures 
and spot prices. In a significant paper, Singleton (2014) demonstrates that money 
flows associated with index investors help predict changes in oil futures prices, 
although recent work by Irwin and Sanders (2014) and Hamilton and Wu (2015) may 
mollify this conclusion. 
     The above motivates using the PSY strategy to assess whether the evidence 
supports there having been financial speculation in the oil futures market during one 
or both of the detected mildly explosive episodes, either from different sources or in 
excess of that implied by normal backwardation or the classical theory of storage. As 
noted earlier, no discrepancy was found when using spot and front-month futures 
prices as the basis of inference. Recent work by Robe and Wallen (2016) has tied 
measures of oil price volatility and economy-wide financial conditions as captured by 
the equity VIX to the oil futures market. Indeed, Cheng et al. (2015) propose a 
transmission mechanism from financial traders to futures markets whereby a 
“convective risk flow” from speculators, who sell in response to rises in risk as prices 
fall, to hedgers, who operate on the other side of the market, reallocates risk from 
groups less able to bear it to groups that can. Empirical evidence, where in their 
framework the VIX acts as a proxy for the risk appetite of financial traders and 
funding constraints, corroborates commodity index traders having an impact on 
commodity futures prices, thereby implying a role for financialization.  Accordingly, 
we shall assess whether there is evidence that the VIX had a role to play in recent oil 
price movements, in particular during the two detected mildly explosive episodes.  Oil 
has its own measure of volatility, the CBOE Crude Oil Volatility Index (OVX), which 



















     The OVX was launched by CBOE as an oil-related volatility index on 3 June 2008 
during the unfolding of the GFC. Data are available at the CBOE official website.  It 
measures oil market uncertainty through options taken on crude oil prices, specifically 
the market’s expectation of the 30-day volatility of WTI nominal prices applying the 
standard CBOE volatility index methodology (discussed briefly in Section 5.6 below) 
to options on the United States Oil Fund.
22
 Implied volatility indices are generally 
derived from option prices, and reflect market expectations on the future volatility 
over the lifetime of the option. Such measures, therefore, allow us the possibility of 
incorporating market-based expectations in a way that traditional fundamental 
variables do not (although this aspect is less important in our approach than it is in a 
forecasting-based approach).  For the interpretation of our results, we need to rely on 
some linkage between the volatility index and futures prices such as discussed in the 
papers cited above. 
     Figure 8A displays WTI benchmark future prices and the OVX.  
[Figure 8A about here] 
The negative relationship between WTI nominal prices and the OVX seen after the 
fall in the oil price in 2008 is notable right through to the end of the sample.  There 
are spikes when volatility is high, around or just after the second (negative) mildly 
explosive episode detected in WTI nominal prices, and for a second time in 2015. To 
apply the PSY test, given the launch date, we need to alter some of the parameters 
chosen above. We continue to use the PSY (2015a) recommended rule-based 
calculation of the initial sample fraction, r0, but use a sample only from January 2009, 
beyond the launch date, to ensure the chosen sample is clear of the oil price shock 
in 2007-08. Table 1D indicates that the GSADF statistic is significant at the 1% 
significance level, meaning that the null of there being no mildly explosive period 
is rejected; however, as reported in Table 6, the second-stage of the test does not 
date a mildly explosive period. 
[Table 6 around here] 
Figure 8B shows that the BSADF sequence does cross the 5% critical value line at 
almost exactly the point of the OPEC meeting, but the crossing is not of sufficient 
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 The United States Oil Fund (USO) is an exchange-traded security designed to track changes in crude 
oil prices.  By holding near-term futures contracts and cash, the performance of the Fund is intended to 



















duration for a mildly explosive episode to be declared. This may indicate the 
OVX, as a forward-looking variable based on expectations, adjusted once-and-for 
all in the aftermath of the meeting. 
[Figure 8B around here] 
On the basis of the ratio of WTI nominal prices to the OVX, the null of no mildly 
explosive episode is not rejected at the 10% significance level, as is reported in 
Table 1F, and so we do not proceed to the date-stamping stage of the test. 
[Table 1F around here] 
Taken at face value, this result is not surprising; for we would expect the OVX to 
act as an omnibus measure that reflects the myriad of influences on the oil price. 
For precisely this reason, however, the results by themselves are uninformative in 
terms of identifying specific drivers. We will therefore treat the OVX results as a 




The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) is the implied volatility of Standard and Poor’s 
S&P 500 equity index over the next 30-day period and is the premier benchmark for 
U.S. stock market volatility.  It is the square root of the risk-neutral expectation of the 
variance of the S&P 500 index over this period, computed on the basis of a weighted 
average of prices for a range of options over the index, and is quoted as a percentage. 
Figure 9A shows that there are two spikes in the VIX during the sample period: the 
first occurs during the later stages of the 2007-08 oil price spike, after the mildly 
explosive episode detected during the run-up in prices;
23
 and in mid-2011 around the 
time of Standard and Poor’s downgrade of U.S. sovereign debt. 
[Figure 9A around here] 
Little upward or downward movement is seen in the VIX during the recent oil price 
decline and there is only a small uptick around the detected mildly explosive episode, 
in marked contrast to the OVX series. The GSADF statistic rejects at the 10% 
significance level the null of no mildly explosive episode, as reported in Table 1D, 
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 That the spike in the VIX occurred during the collapse-phase of the 2007-08 spike is not unexpected 





















but no such episode is dated in the second stage of the test. Figure 9A shows that the 
BSADF sequence cuts the 5% critical value line during the 2007-08 oil price spike 
but not for a sufficient time period for a mildly explosive episode to be declared.  It 
may be, however, that the VIX is more relevant during the collapse phase of the 
spike. Accordingly, we apply the reverse regression procedure of Phillips and Shi 
(2018). 
[Table 7 and Figure 9B around here] 
When the minimum duration condition is not applied, two short mildly explosive 
episodes are detected, the latter into 2009. This may suggest the VIX had some 
influence during and after the collapse phase of the oil price spike, reflecting greater 
uncertainty at this time. There is, however, no such declared episode when the 
standard condition is applied. 
     As reported in Table 1F, the ratio of WTI prices to the VIX does not reject the null 
of no mildly explosive episode at the 10% significance level and so we do not 
proceed to the date-stamping stage of the test.  Inspection of the BSADF sequence in 
Figure 9C shows that this rejection occurs without the sequence cutting the 5% 
critical value line, which points to the need for further analysis. 
[Figure 9C around here] 
Because the ratio of the WTI nominal price series to the VIX is the same as the ratio 
of the WTI real prices to the VIX deflated by U.S. CPI, we consider the BSADF 
sequence of the ratio of the VIX to the U.S. CPI series, shown in Figure 9D, to try to 
gain more insight into the first-stage non-rejection. Nothing substantively different 
emerges compared with the VIX levels case: the BSADF sequence again cuts the 5% 
critical value line in late 2008 – in the collapse phase of the 2007-08 oil price spike – 
and there is no spike in late 2014. 
[Figure 9D around here] 
Running the PSY test on the ratio of WTI nominal prices to the S&P 500 index itself 
indicates that the null of no mildly explosive episode is rejected at the 1% 
significance level and, as reported in Table 8, the same mildly explosive episodes are 
detected as using WTI nominal prices alone even given the evidence reported by 
Silvennoinen and Thorp (2013) that the two variables have become increasingly 



















[Table 8 around here] 
This offers prima facie evidence to suggest there were factors beyond stock prices 
driving both departures from random walk behavior.  At face value, the failure of the 
ratio of WTI prices to the VIX to detect the departures seen in the WTI series offers 
corroborative evidence consistent with Cheng et al. (2015) and Robe and Wallen 
(2016) who tie WTI futures prices to the VIX.  The supporting evidence, however, 
suggests otherwise. Firstly, the rise in the VIX occurs after the high point of crude oil 
prices in 2008 and therefore after the dated mildly explosive episode; there is no 
spike in the VIX in late 2014 in contrast to that seen in the oil-specific OVX; and the 
results are the same for both nominal and real prices. On the basis of the PSY testing 
strategy, it is therefore difficult to support the VIX having played a role in driving the 
level of oil prices around 2007-08 or during the post-2014 oil price decline. 
Inspection of the BSADF sequence in Figure 9C suggests that the VIX series is 
considerably more volatile than the oil price series, and this volatility translates into 
the ratio of prices. It may be that the PSY test, which derives its statistical power 
from its concentration of focus on the autoregressive parameter, and relies on a 
minimum duration condition in the date-stamping stage, is not conducive towards 
assessing the actual role of the VIX.  arket expectations of oil price volatility 
should be higher during periods of financial stress and so we would expect the VIX 
to be a good predictor of the volatility in oil prices, but not necessarily their levels as 
is tested for here. 
 
5.7. Non-commercial positions and speculation 
The evidence presented above points to the mildly explosive episode detected in the 
run-up in oil prices during the 2007-08 spike as having been driven by a real economy 
fundamental: a mildly explosive episode in the BDI leading indicator proxy for global 
economic activity preceded the same in both WTI and Brent benchmark oil prices in 
mid-2008. Alongside this, on the basis of a counterfactual from Kilian and Lee’s 
(2014) approach, which embodied speculation within the classical theory of storage, 
above-ground inventories were seen not to have been decisive. Sockin and Xiong 
(2015) argue, however, that the period coinciding with our detected mildly explosive 



















begun to show signs of weakness and that, even if growth in the emerging economies 
remained strong, a price rise of around 40% between January and July 2008 was not 
justified by global economic activity alone. 
     Using the PSY test applied to Commitments of Traders (CoT) position data 
published by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), we can 
assess whether and to what extent there is a contribution from financialization that 
may have amplified the effects of this rising demand. This data breaks down the 
overall open interest between the positions of commercials (“hedgers”) and non-
commericials (“speculators”).
24
  Büyükşahin and Harris (2011), Büyükşahin and Robe 
(2014) and others employ Working’s T-index as a measure of “excess speculation”: it 
calculates the amount of speculation in excess of what is minimally necessary to meet 
short and long hedging demand. If we write long and short commercial (hedge) 
positions as HL and HS, and long and short non-commercial (speculative) positions as 
SL and SS, Working’s T-index is defined by 
   1 1
1 S L s S L L
L S
H H S H H S
T
H H
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 

                 (8) 
If T = 1, the level of non-commercial activity is just sufficient to be available as 
counterparties for the commercial imbalance. Any excess over unity implies that 
speculators are acting as counterparties for each other.  Here, we provide a direct test 
for excess speculation by applying the PSY test to a time series of Working’s T-index. 
     The GSADF statistic as reported in Table 1G shows that the null of no mildly 
explosive period is rejected at the 1% significance level.  
[Table 1G around here] 
The BSADF sequence as shown in Figure 10 indicates than at no point prior to the 
high point of nominal and real oil prices in 2008 did the sequence cut the 5% critical 
value line. 
[Figure 10 around here] 
There is therefore no evidence provided by the PSY test to suggest that excess 
speculation played a role either in the run-up in oil prices from 2003 or during the 
2007-08 spike seen during the GFC. The index rises from late 2014 onward but no 
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mildly explosive episode coinciding with the detected periods in nominal and real 
prices is reported in Table 9. 
[Table 9 around here] 
Such is the rise in the index that an episode is dated from end-April 2015 to the 
beginning of January 2016.  This may indicate that there have been changes in the oil 
market that have occurred in response to the recent oil price decline, although any 
such consideration is outside the scope of the current paper. Our main result 
corroborates the conclusions of Sanders and Irwin (2014), and Hamilton and Wu 
(2015), that excess speculation through financialization did not drive either the run-up 
phase in the 2007-08 price spike or the mid-June 2014 to early-2016 price decline. 
Recent evidence provided by Yan, Irwin and Sanders (2018) strengthens this 
conclusion for the 2007-08 period. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides an analysis of crude oil prices around and in the aftermath of the 
GFC.  Many of the recent hypotheses on oil prices and their drivers have been put 
forward in the literature in a way that does not properly subject them to a statistical test 
and, therefore, to the capability of being rejected on the basis of the data.  Here, we have 
used the PSY testing strategy in all its elements to create an evidence base against which 
the implications of structural models of the oil market – actual and potential – can be 
assessed. This approach provided new and often clarifying evidence on some of the 
recent controversies surrounding oil prices during and in the aftermath of the GFC. 
     Our main conclusions are as follows: 
1. Two periods of mild exposivity were detected in oil prices during and in the 
aftermath of the GFC.  A statistically significant rise beyond that consistent with 
random walk behavior is detected in both Brent and WTI, real and nominal, spot 
and benchmark crude oil futures prices between mid-May and mid-July 2008, in 
the midst of the GFC. A similar, shorter episode was detected in the midst of the 
post-June 2014 to early-2016 price decline, beginning in late-November or early-
December 2014 and lasting for up to two months. Insofar as the date-stamping 
stage of PSY strategy contained some overlap with the extant literature, we 



















dollar numeraire and for possible non-stationary volatility during the sample 
period. The depreciating dollar in early 2008 and the appreciating dollar in 2014 
were not found to be decisive, corroborating the view of Baumeister and Kilian 
(2016) but contradicting the view of Baffes et al. (2015). The use of spot prices or 
front-month futures prices was found to be inconsequential empirically; in 
particular, the recent detection in the literature of an earlier explosive period in 
Brent spot prices compared with front-month futures prices was found not to be 
robust. 
2. The end of the first mildly explosive period coincided with the end of the run-up 
in nominal prices in 2008 and, on the basis of a statistical test, was formally and 
precisely dated to an oil-specific event: an announcement by U.S. President 
George W. Bush that ended an executive ban on offshore drilling.  This marked, 
at the same time, a low point of the U.S. dollar. 
3. New evidence is provided to indicate that the rise in oil prices during the 2007-08 
spike was driven by a real economy fundamental, global economic activity, 
corroborating a conclusion on the determinants of oil prices during this period that 
Hamilton (2009) and Kilian (2009) derived through different means. Our results 
are also consistent with the view of Kilian and Hicks (2013) that the sustained rise 
in oil prices from 2003 to 2008 was demand-driven. Evidence from directly 
applying the third-stage of the PSY testing strategy indicates the behavior of the 
fundamental changed during the early stages of GFC, and itself exhibited mildly 
explosive behavior during this time. This offers a new insight into why the rise in 
oil prices during the GFC was different from previous periods. 
4. The date-stamp on a short, second episode during the post-June 2014 price 
decline, robustly found across all the oil price series considered herein, ties with 
the immediate aftermath of an OPEC meeting in late-November 2014 where the 
cartel, faced with a glut, chose not reinforce its longstanding policy of defending 
prices. Taken at face value, this corroborates the view of Azeki and Blanchard 
(2014) and Baffes et al. (2015) that the outcome of this meeting constituted a 
significant supply shock to oil prices and negates the view of Baumeister and 
Kilian (2016) as to the meeting’s lack of decisive importance. We recognize that 



















supply shock or a demand shock; however, we found that the behavior of other 
commodities, which would have been similarly exposed to a negative global 
demand shock, was not decisive in explaining the detected short shift to a mildly 
explosive regime. 
5. On the basis of counterfactuals provided by structural models, neither above-
ground inventories nor the supply of U.S. shale oil was found to have been 
decisive in driving the departures from random walk behavior during the 2007-08 
spike or 2014-16 price decline. This does not mean such variables are unimportant 
in determining prices. For example, actual and potential increases in the U.S. 
shale oil supply may have driven the outcome of the OPEC meeting in November 
2014. 
6. In spite of recent work by Cheng et al. (2015) and Robe and Wallen (2016) tying 
crude oil futures to the VIX, we find no hard evidence to suggest that the VIX 
decisively influenced oil price levels during the sample period.  On the basis of a 
direct test using Working’s T-index constructed with CFTC position data, no 
evidence was found to suggest that excess speculation was a contributory factor to 
either the 2007-08 spike or 2014-16 price decline. This corroborates the view of 
Irwin and Sanders (2014) and Hamilton and Wu (2015) and contradicts the 
conclusion of Singleton (2014). 
 
From the point of view of the extant oil price literature, the new evidence provided on 
the role of a real economic variable in the run-up in oil prices in 2008 and the lack of 
evidence of a role for financialization or speculation are probably the most important. 
Because of the continuing ramifications of the GFC and ongoing questions concerning 
post-GFC regulation, they continue to be relevant issues for academics and 
policymakers more than a decade on.  Recent work by Pavlidis et al. (2018) and Kruse 
and Wegener (2019) attests to this, and interestingly they too find evidence in favour 
of a decisive role for an economic fundamental in 2008, obtained by very different 
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GSADF  Test Statistics 
ICE Brent Crude nominal front-month futures and spot 
2003 - 2016 (weekly data) 
 
Brent   Brent/CPI         Brent/SDR 
Futures 4.382 4.349              4.377 
Spot 5.313 5.378              5.142 
This table reports the GSADF statistic for ICE Brent Crude nominal front-month 
futures prices and the GSADF statistics for this series deflated by a U.S. CPI series 
interpolated weekly by and an SDR factor to control for the changing dollar 
numeraire. The initial window for recursive estimation is 47 weeks. The ADF lag is 
chosen to minimize the BIC over every subsample with maximum lag length set at 5 





GSADF  Test Statistics 
NYMEX WTI Crude nominal front-month futures  
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
      WTI   WTI/CPI WTI/SDR 
Futures       4.935    4.898   4.848 
Spot       4.541    4.515     4.624 
This table reports the GSADF statistics for NYMEX WTI Crude nominal front-
month futures month prices and the GSADF statistics for this series adjusted by U.S. 
CPI and by an SDR factor to control for the changing dollar numeraire. Standard 





GSADF  Test Statistics 
LME Copper and Zinc nominal three-month futures  
& Bloomberg Commodity Index 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
              Cu              Zn BCI 
GSADF 7.963  6.528 2.187 
This table reports GSADF statistics for LME copper and zinc nominal three-month 
futures prices and the Bloomberg Commodity Index. Standard PSY Critical values: 

























GSADF  Test Statistic 
Fundamental measures (in levels) 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
                        BDI  Inventories   VIX OVX * 
GSADF          4.315     1.882   3.238 3.056 
This table reports GSADF statistics for the Baltic Dry Index (BDI); U.S. end-of-
week stocks (EIA data); and the VIX and OVX volatility index measures. Standard 
PSY Critical values: 2.069 (10%), 2.282 (5%) and 2.664 (1%). 
 
*Note that for the OVX measure, the sample runs from 2009 to 2016 and the initial value 






GSADF  Test Statistics 
WTI Crude Nominal Front-Month Prices deflated by fundamental proxy 
variables and financial variables 




Dry Index  
      
  
WTI/inventories  WTI/S&P500         
4.850  4.930  4.703  
This table reports GSADF statistics for WTI front month NYMEX futures weighted 
by (a) the Baltic Dry Index; (b) U.S. end-of-week (WTI) crude oil stocks (Source: 







GSADF  Test Statistics 
Nominal Crude Oil Prices deflated by Volatility Measures 
2003-2016 VIX deflated (weekly data) 
 2007-2016 OVX deflated (weekly data) 
 
WTI/OVX   WTI/VIX         Brent/VIX 
Futures 0.992 0.525 1.072 
Spot 1.023 1.169 2.524 
This table reports GSADF statistics for WTI Crude nominal front-month and spot 
prices deflated by the OVX index and GSADF statistics for both WTI Crude and 
Brent Crude nominal front-month futures prices deflated by the CBOE VIX index. 















































Table 2A: ICE Brent Crude nominal prices 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
 
Front-Month Futures Prices 
Nominal CPI deflated SDR deflated 
   Start End Start End Start End 
 16-5-2008 18-7-2008 16-5-2008 18-7-2008 16-05-2008            25-07-2008* 
05-12-2014 06-02-2015 05-12-2014 13-02-2015  5-12-2014       06-02-2015 
 
Spot Prices 
 23-05-2008     25-07-2008       No  mild explosivity   16-05-08         25-07-2008 
24-10-2014     06-02-2015 17-10-2014 06-02-2015  5-12-2014     06-02-2015    
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
This table reports detected mildly explosive periods in ICE Brent crude weekly nominal 
front-month futures and the same deflated by an interpolated U.S. CPI series and by the 
currency value of the SDR basket using the PSY procedure with 5% size. 













GSADF  Test Statistic 
Working’s T index 




      
2.823 GSADF 
This table reports the GSADF statistic for 
Working’s T-index calculated using data on 
Commercial Long, Commercial Short, Non-
Commerical Long and Non-Commercial Short 
positions. The initial window for recursive 
estimation is 47 weeks. The ADF lag is chosen to 
minimize the BIC over every subsample with the 
maximum lag length set at 5 weeks. Standard PSY 
Critical values: 2.069 (10%), 2.282 (5%) and 



















Table 2B: NYMEX WTI Crude nominal prices 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
 
Front-Month Futures Prices 
Nominal CPI deflated SDR deflated 
   Start End Start End      Start           End 
 16-5-2008 18-7-2008 16-5-2008 18-7-2008   23-04-08          18-07-2008 
05-12-2014 06-02-2015 21-11-2014 06-02-2015   21-11-14      06-02-2015 
 
Spot Prices 
 16-05-08 25-07-08    16-05-08    18-07-2008   16-05-08       25-07-2008 
05-12-2014 06-02-2015 05-12-2014 06-02-2015  5-12-2014    06-02-2014 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
This table reports detected mildly explosive periods in NYMEX WTI crude oil weekly 
nominal front-month futures and spot prices and the same deflated by an interpolated U.S. 
CPI series and by the currency value of the SDR basket using the PSY procedure with 5% 
size. 





Table 2C: ICE Brent Crude nominal front-month futures prices 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behaviour 
(reverse regression case) 
 
      Standard minimum duration condition 
                     (log(T) = 7 ) 
No minimum duration condition applied 
GSADF statistic: 2.019        
 
    Start    End     Start    End 


















This table reports detected mildly explosive periods in Brent crude nominal front-month 
weekly futures prices using the PSY procedure applied to a reverse regression with and 
without the standard minimum duration condition.  The test size is 5%.  *Only detected at the 



























Table 2D: ICE Brent Crude real front-month futures prices 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
(reverse regression case) 
 
    Standard minimum duration condition 
                     (log(T) = 7 ) 
No minimum duration condition applied 
GSADF statistic: 1.910            
 
    Start    End     Start    End 








  2-6-2008 
 
 







This table reports detected mildly explosive periods in Brent crude real (i.e. U.S.-CPI-
deflated) front-month weekly futures prices using the PSY procedure applied to a reverse 
regression with and without the standard minimum duration condition.  The test size is 5%.  





Table 2E: NYMEX WTI Crude nominal front-month futures prices 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behaviour 
(reverse regression case) 
 
Standard minimum duration condition 
                     (log(T) = 7 ) 
No minimum duration condition applied 
GSADF statistic: 1.987      
 









No mildly explosive 
episode 








This table reports detected mildly explosive periods in WTI crude nominal front-month 
weekly futures prices using the PSY procedure applied to a reverse regression with and 
without the standard minimum duration condition.  The test size is 5%.  *Only detected at 






























Table 2F: NYMEX WTI Crude real front-month futures prices 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
(reverse regression case) 
 
Standard minimum duration condition 
                     (log(T) = 7 ) 
No minimum duration condition applied 
GSADF statistic: 1.904 
     
     
    Start    End     Start    End 
No mildly explosive 
episode 
No mildly explosive 
episode 
 
No mildly explosive 
episode 










This table reports detected mildly explosive periods in WTI crude real (i.e. U.S.-CPI 
deflated) front-month weekly futures prices using the PSY procedure applied to a reverse 
regression with and without the standard minimum duration condition.  The test size is 5%. 






Table 2G: ICE Brent Crude nominal spot prices 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
under wild bootstrapped critical values 
 






This table reports detected mildly explosive periods in Brent crude nominal spot weekly 
futures prices using the PSY procedure.  The wild bootstrap is applied to generate 
automatic critical values to control for non-stationary volatility in the data, *12% test size.  






































Table 2H: NYMEX WTI Crude front-month futures 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
under wild bootstrapped critical values 
 
             WTI nominal          WTI nominal/CPI 









       No explosive period 
        
       12-12-2014 





This table reports detected mildly explosive periods in NYMEX WTI crude weekly 
nominal front-month futures prices and the same deflated by an interpolated U.S. CPI series 
using the wild-bootstrapped-adjusted PSY procedure with 10% size.  




Table 2H: ICE Brent Crude front-month futures 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
under wild bootstrapped critical values 
 
             Brent nominal          Brent nominal/CPI 








       No explosive period 
        




This table reports detected mildly explosive periods in ICE Brent crude weekly nominal 
front-month futures prices and the same deflated by an interpolated U.S. CPI series using 





































Table 3: Other Commodities and Commodity Indices 
LME Copper and Zinc three-month futures prices & Bloomberg Commodity Index 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
 
             Copper                 Zinc                  BCI 
   Start End Start End      Start             End 
 24-03-2006 16-06-2006 09-12-2005 17-02-2006    23-04-2008       18-7-2008* 
 
 03-03-2006 16-06-2006    21-11-14      06-02-2015* 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
This table reports mildly explosive periods in the LME copper and zinc three-month futures 
prices and the Bloomberg Commodity Index (BCI) using the PSY procedure with 5% size. 
*Only detected at the 10% level. 




Table 4: Levels of fundamental proxy variables:  
Baltic Dry Index and U.S. end-of-week Stocks 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
 
                       BDI                  U.S. stocks 
     
      Start 
    
    End 
    
    Start  
 
     End 
   13-04-2007 
   24-08-2007 
01-06-2007 
21-12-2007 
 01-04-2005 17-06-2005* 
 
This table reports detected mildly explosive periods for the levels of a demand-side 
fundamental (Baltic Dry Index, BDI) and a supply-side fundamental (U.S. EIA end-
of-week stocks) using the PSY test with a 5% significance level. *This period is only 




































Table 5: Ratios of WTI nominal front-month futures prices  
to fundamental proxy variables:  
Baltic Dry Index and U.S. EIA Stocks 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
 
Futures Prices 
          Nominal WTI/BDI        Nominal WTI/stocks 
     
      Start 
    
    End 
    
    Start 
 
     End 
   10-06-2005 








This table reports detected mildly explosive periods for the ratios of WTI front-
month futures and prices to a demand-side fundamental (the BDI) and a supply-side 






Table 6: Levels of fundamental proxy and financial variables 
OVX and VIX 
 
VIX levels: Jan 2003- Apr 2016 (weekly data) 
OVX levels: Jan 2009 – Apr 2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
 
                       VIX              OVX 
               No mildly       
     explosive period 
 




This table reports detected mildly explosive periods for the levels of the OVX and VIX 




































Table 7: VIX levels 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price behavior 
(reverse regression case) 
 
Standard minimum duration condition 
                  (log(T) = 7) 
    No duration condition applied 
      GSADF statistic:  2.630               GSADF statistic:  2.63 
      Start    End     Start    End 
      No mildly       






This table reports mildly explosive periods in VIX weekly nominal prices using reverse 





Table 8: Ratios of WTI nominal prices to financial variables:  
S&P500 index 
2003-2016 (weekly data) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of mildly explosive price 
behavior 
 
                      WTI nominal/S&P500  
 
Start 








This table reports detected mildly explosive periods for the ratios 
of WTI front-month futures prices to the S&P500 index using the 

















































































Table 9: Levels of fundamental proxy 
variables:  
CFTC 2003-2016 (weekly data, collected 
Tuesdays) 
 
Estimated start and end dates for periods of 
mildly explosive price behavior 
 
CFTC  
     
       Start 
    
        End 
   05-01-2016 
 
 
   21-04-2015  
 
This table reports detected mildly explosive 
periods for the levels of a demand-side 
fundamental (Baltic Dry Index, BDI) and a 
supply-side fundamental (U.S. EIA end-of-




















Figure 1A: ICE Brent and NYMEX WTI crude nominal front-month futures 
























































































































































































































Brent 1 month futures diferences












































































































Figure 4B. BSADF sequence: Brent CPI-deflated spot prices with wild 










































Figure 4C. BSADF sequence: WTI front-month futures nominal prices with wild 







































































Figure 7. BSADF sequence: Ratio of WTI crude nominal prices to U.S. above-












































Figure 8A. WTI crude oil front month futures and the CBOE Oil Volatility 























































Figure 9C: BSADF sequence: Ratio of WTI front-month futures nominal price 
to VIX 











































































df 5% VIX deflated Price
 
 

























Figure 10.  BSADF sequence: Working T-index (WTI CFTC position data) 
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